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Experimentalist governance, deliberation and democracy: 
A case study of primary commodity roundtables  
 
James Brassett, Ben Richardson, & William Smith 
 
Abstract 
The emergence of primary commodity roundtables that seek to regulate producers according 
to principles of sustainability represents an interesting set of dilemmas. Made up of self-
selected combinations of private organizations, global civil society, and interested 
stakeholders they blur commonly held understandings of governance and democracy in 
global context. On the one hand, the absence of states suggests that, to the extent that they are 
successful in applying and enforcing a rigorous standard of sustainability, they must count as 
private makers of global public policy. On the other hand, the inclusion of global civil society 
within their membership suggests a set of questions for how to conceptualise and develop 
understandings of the political role of such organizations. In this paper, we step back from a 
view of global civil society as necessarily acting ‘in opposition to’ either the state or private 
organizations, and instead seek to unpick how civil society organisations work with, within 
and against roundtables. We do this, moreover, by situating our analysis within a broader set 
of macro level considerations about governance and regulation in global perspective that 
focuses on the deliberative and democratic possibilities (and limits) of roundtables. In 
particular, we develop and critically evaluate the pragmatist theory of experimentalist 
governance as a framework for understanding and evaluating Roundtables. While 
experimentalism offers a number of fruitful avenues for thinking about and practicing 
deliberative global governance via Rountable we address two limitations. Firstly, the absence 
of a supportive social background for deliberation implies creative thinking is required with 
regards to fostering a level of ‘deliberation against’ Roundtables. Secondly, in a related point 
we raise questions of scale:  the mode of regulation via Roundtables privileges quantitative 
assessment to render commodity chains in ‘singular’ and ‘vertical’ terms. We therefore raise 
‘off farm’ issues of how decisions in one commodity sector have implications for others, and, 
further, how global regulation can overlook local compromises between the environment and 
agriculture. We therefore conclude by identifying a number of challenges for developing the 
theory and practice of experimentalist governance.          
Keywords: Deliberation, Democracy, Roundtables, Global Civil Society, Sustainability           
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Introduction: Experimentalist Governance via Roundtables 
 
The challenges of establishing democracy at the global level – including scale/complexity, 
diffuse authority and unspecified constituencies – have led a number of authors to identify 
deliberative mechanisms as a means of embedding democratic values in global governance 
(Bohman 1999; Dryzek 2006). A basic idea of deliberative approaches is that global 
decisions should be made through an exchange of arguments between affected parties about 
the best way to address collective problems.1 This paper engages with a particular version of 
this approach, ‘experimentalist governance’, as a framework for understanding and 
evaluating the complex organisational structure of global governance (Cohen and Sabel 
2006). The approach contends that experimental decision-making units with plural (possibly 
overlapping) constituencies and robust peer review systems can foster ‘democratic 
destabilisations’, in turn fostering increases in the level and quality of transnational 
deliberation (Sabel and Zeitlen 2008). Advocates of experimentalist governance have claimed 
that the best realization of their ideal is the complex administrative structures of the European 
Union (EU). But they also express the hope, supported by empirical reflections, that this 
model can be ‘up-scaled’ to the global level.  
Our paper tests these aspirations for global democracy, through considering the extent 
to which a recent experiment in regulating global trade succeeds in realizing the aspirations 
of experimentalist governance. The centrepiece of our analysis is a case study of primary 
commodities roundtables, which institute dialogue between civil society and industry actors 
geared towards achieving an effective regime of standard-setting. By focusing on primary 
commodities roundtables—their governance, regulation, and attempt to benchmark producers 
against principles of ‘sustainability’—we explore the potential of subjecting contentious areas 
of global trade to the rigours of experimentalist governance.  
Our findings offer some basis for optimism about the value of employing 
experimentalism as a framework for reforming this area of global governance. The 
                                                             
1 We understand deliberation in minimalist terms as a process of public reasoning geared toward generating political 
decisions or public opinion about how to resolve shared problems. This definition contrasts with ‘thicker’ notions 
that impute a more comprehensive set of democratic values including representation, non-domination, 
egalitarianism and inclusion (See inter alia Dryzek, Bohman, Held). While we are sympathetic to such approaches, we 
argue that in order to provide an adequate purchase on the ongoing practices of global governance, they would need 
to provide a more detailed account of how actually-existing deliberations are able to promote such values (Smith and 
Brassett, 2008; Brassett and Smith, 2010). A minimalist concept of deliberation can foster a more nuanced 
movement between theory and practice which both allows us to reflect the often imperfect manifestation of 
deliberative practices in global governance as well as suggest how broader democratic values might emerge.  
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roundtables exhibit some of the virtues of deliberative global governance, including 
innovative modes of accountability that are particularly appropriate to global contexts and the 
advancement of certain democratic values through civil society participation. At the same 
time, however, our findings suggest that experimentalist governance faces significant 
challenges if it is to advance its long term aim of creating a ‘global democratic subject’. In 
particular, the absence of a supportive social background for democracy in global trade 
means the potential for entrenching concepts like sustainability is somewhat haphazard and 
sometimes left to the chance abilities of NGOs to impact upon Roundtables via the 
mobilisation of public opinion. In this sense, we highlight the need for reflection on the role 
of deliberations ‘against’ Roundtables on issues of sustainability, which, while ostensibly 
oppositional point to the possible emergence of a critical ‘global public sphere’ (Bohman, 
1999). More critically, we highlight how the actual mode of regulation via Roundtables often 
involves a move to quantitative assessment that raises its own deliberative and democratic 
issues. A constitutive effect of regulation via roundtables is to render commodity chains in 
‘singular’ and ‘vertical’ terms. In terms of sustainability, we therefore suggest that regulation 
can be blinkered in terms of diversity, i.e. it overlooks the way that decisions in one 
commodity sector have implications for others, and in terms of social embedded-ness, i.e. the 
local compromises between the environment and agriculture. In short, there are fundamental 
dilemmas in the substantive content of roundtables that should be highlighted if we are to 
engage with their genuinely democratic implications.        
The argument proceeds in three sections. Section 1 introduces experimentalist 
governance via three key elements: the critique of principal-agent models of accountability 
and the proposal of ‘deliberative polyarchy’ as an alternative; the role of civil society in 
contributing to beneficial ‘democratic destabilisations’; and the aspiration for global 
democracy. We argue that questions of practicality and democratic culture should be 
addressed if experimentalism is to become a robust framework for deliberative global 
governance. Section 2 locates these questions via a case study of primary commodities 
Roundtables that see firms engage in standards setting for environmental and social 
sustainability. Our analysis yields detailed evidence about the internal and external 
deliberations of roundtables, particularly the ways in which non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) have deliberated within but also against such bodies. Section 3 draws theory and 
practice together. We assess the roundtables through reference to the three aspects of 
experimentalist governance discussed in the first section: their departure from principal-agent 
models of accountability; their capacity to instigate democratic destabilizations; and their 
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status as genuine experiments in global democracy. A concluding section draws the argument 
together by addressing the two questions raised at the end of the first section. Our aim is to 
generate a set of reflections which illustrate the virtues of combining continued development 
of experimentalist governance with sober recognition of the challenges of democratizing the 
global realm. 
 
1. Experimentalist governance 
This section provides a sympathetic appraisal of experimental governance that sets out the 
case for developing and applying it to global governance. The key challenge, from our point 
of view, is whether and how this model can be ‘up-scaled’ from its current most likely home 
in the EU – ‘blessed’ as it is with a tradition of complex and multilayered policy making – to 
other areas of global governance that are less state-centric and rely more on private 
organizations. This section focuses on three related aspects of experimentalist governance: 
first, its critique of principal-agent models of accountability; second, its notion of democratic 
destabilization; and third, its aspirations for global democracy. 
 
1.1 The principal-agent model and deliberative polyarchy 
Experimentalist governance is a concept that emerges from a range of authors working in and 
around the study of deliberative multi-level governance, focusing on emerging questions 
about the role of NGOs, standards-setting bodies, and complex supra-national governance 
arrangements where sovereignty is either pooled or diffuse (Cohen and Sabel 2006; Sabel and 
Zeitlen 2008). The basic proposition of such work is that we need to move beyond an account 
of multi-level governance that retains a clear link between ‘principals and agents’ in policy-
making and instead embrace an open-ended ‘experimental’ approach to governance 
arrangements (Sabel 2004). The principal-agent model presupposes that, among a group of 
actors seeking to coordinate their activities, at least one actor—the ‘principal’—is capable of 
defining ex ante collective goals and policy strategies in a sufficiently clear and robust 
fashion. This principal delegates authority to an ‘agent’, who is then held to account through 
reference to those ex ante standards (Cohen and Sabel 2006: 774). 
The principal-agent model breaks down, according to experimentalists, in contexts 
where no actor has access to clear ex ante goals and strategies. The actors in these contexts 
only have access to a range of loosely specified goals, such that ‘actors have to learn what 
problems they are solving and what solutions they are seeking through the very process of 
problem solving’ (Cohen and Sabel 2006: 774). This state-of-affairs requires a system of 
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policy-making that incorporates deliberation as the core method of discovering collective 
goals and monitoring their realization and so ‘deliberative polyarchy’ is introduced as an 
alternative to the principal-agent model of accountability (Cohen and Sabel 1997). The 
scheme is ‘deliberative’ in the sense that ‘questions are decided by argument about the best 
ways to address problems, not simply exertions of power, expressions of interest, or 
bargaining from power positions on the basis of interests’ (Cohen and Sabel 2006: 779). The 
scheme is a ‘polyarchy’ because of ‘its use of situated deliberation within decision-making 
units and deliberative comparisons across those units to enable them to engage in a mutually 
disciplined and responsive exploration of their particular variant of common problems’ 
(Cohen and Sabel 2006: 780).  
Deliberative polyarchy thus incorporates a complex process of collaboration and peer-
review between a range of ‘units’ responsible for policy-formulation, implementation, 
appraisal and revision. The sharing of information and experience between units facilitates a 
process of ‘social learning’ about the best approaches to a variety of problems. And the 
process of mutual review and monitoring ensures that each unit remains accountable to at 
least one, or possibly more, units in the problem-solving chain. The pluralism of this 
decision-making structure—with its emphasis on multiple units engaged in social learning—
replaces the simple ‘principal-agent’ model. 
The institutional arrangements favoured by the idea of deliberative polyarchy are 
realized to the fullest extent in the EU. The model depends on formal relations between 
different units in the chain, such as the Commission, regulatory units, and Member States. 
These units each have defined responsibilities and are obliged to report their progress and 
achievements to one another and there is a possibility that underperforming units are subject 
to ‘penalty defaults’. The relationship between the EU Commission and the Florence 
Electricity Forum is cited as an example of such a penalty. The Commission periodically 
threatens to invoke its formal powers under EU antitrust, merger control and state aid rules as 
a response to intransigence or obstructionist strategies by participants to the Forum. The use 
of these powers is regarded as sub-optimal by participants and is thus an incentive to reaching 
agreement within the Forum (Cohen and Zeitlin 2008: 306-8). This illustrates how, within the 
EU, social learning goes hand-in-glove with the threat of sanctions to cajole participants to 
deliberate. 
The idea of deliberative polyarchy, along with its parent framework of experimentalist 
governance, has much to recommend it. There is a genuine attempt here to take the day-to-
day complexity of EU governance seriously, identifying a logic to practices that have 
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commonly been understood via mapping metaphors of multi-level, multi-actor arrangements, 
cross cutting cleavages and/or neo-medievalism, or in more critical terms of substantive 
technical associations, epistemic communities and more or less bland ‘comitology’. The fact 
that experimentalist governance identifies logics of monitoring, which move back and forth 
between autonomous attempts to achieve framework goals and open comparisons with other 
attempts brings forward a pragmatic account of deliberation. That is to say, doubt and social 
learning become an integral element of the feat of exchanging ideas, or translating, from one 
set of experiences to another. As Gerstenburg and Sabel, (2002: 13) argue:  
the exchange of ideas among those with differing views of the world is a condition of 
self understanding, not a feat of transcendence. Identities and interests are emergent, 
not fixed. Jurisdictional boundaries are not fixed limits and reminders of identity, but 
rather the starting points for problem-solving investigations which entertain the 
possibility, among other things, or revising the boundaries along with the conceptions 
they mark.  The polity, no longer personified, itself gives meaning to the frameworks 
it adopts, and need no longer delegate this task to a separate administration of experts. 
 
1.2 Democratic destabilisation and civil society 
The preceding analysis indicates some of the attractions of experimentalist governance as a 
mechanism for making and delivering policy, but its status as a democratic theory of 
governance appears to be less evident. In fact, the ideas of polyarchy and peer review suggest 
a form of governance more akin to rule by technocrats and policy elites than rule by the 
people. Indeed, this is one of the principal complaints that critics invoke against the EU and 
which advocates of deliberative democratic reform often seek to address (Fishkin 2009: 175-
83). The proponents of experimentalist governance are aware of this concern and 
consequently devote considerable attention to rejecting the appearance of technocracy and 
bolstering the democratic credentials of their theory. 
The concept of democratic destabilisation plays a central role in their endeavours. 
Although this concept is said to be exportable to a range of governance contexts, it receives 
its most detailed explication, once again, in relation to the EU. According to Sabel and 
Zeiltin: “the dynamic accountability of EU governance has a potentially democratising 
destabilisation effect on domestic politics, and through them, in return, on the EU itself.” 
(Sabel and Zeitlen 2008: 277). The idea is that the creation of transnational or global sites of 
administration triggers a series of reactions within and across the territorial boundaries of the 
nation state. The key feature of these reactions is that they are deliberative. In other words, 
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the newly created forums of administrations trigger an informed and inclusive process of 
reason giving between and within diverse democratic publics pursuing mutually acceptable 
resolutions of collective problems (Cohen and Sabel 2006: 780). The process of peer review 
contributes to this destabilization, in that it establishes a contest between competing sources 
of technocratic authority, which undercuts the threat of rule by a unified corpus of policy 
elites. Interestingly, NGOs play an important role in democratic destabilization, through 
contributing to member-state and Europe-wide deliberation about appropriate policy goals, 
thus counter-balancing the danger of government through technocracy.  
NGOs are often ascribed an important role in deliberative arguments as a kind of 
communicative ‘conveyor-belt’ between administrative bodies and the communities 
significantly impacted by their decisions. NGOs play an important ‘in-put’ role, by 
communicating the concerns of populations to participants in institutionalized deliberation, 
and also a vital ‘out-put’ role, by communicating the decisions and justification of global 
administrative bodies to the communities that they govern (Nanz and Steffek 2005). 
However, we would argue that the account of civil society suggested by experimentalist 
governance is, at times, surprisingly conventional. That is to say, civil society is ascribed an 
essentially reactive role as a means of contesting deliberation that takes place within 
institutional forums comprised of government actors and technocratic policy experts. This 
tends to paint civil society as a homogenous and oppositional force, which operates outside 
and against the forums of decision-making. As our discussion of the roundtables will 
illustrate, there is, in fact, significant scope for ascribing to civil society a more diverse and 
inclusive role in governance. In so doing, we pick up on the important role that NGOs play 
not merely as stakeholders involved in the ex post evaluation of policy, but also as active 
participants in the policy-making process itself  (Cochran 2002; See also Brassett and Smith, 
2010). 
In summary, democratic destabilization suggests one route to the advancement of 
democratic values. But it should be noted that advocates are modest about championing the 
democratic credentials of experimentalist governance. According to Cohen and Zeitlin, ‘in 
undermining technocracy through democratising destabilisation the new architecture does not 
automatically produce democratic outcomes’. They continue: ‘new forms of decision making 
promote forms of accountability that are consistent with some aspects of democracy, though 
not necessarily furthering representative democracy in any traditional way’ (Sabel and 
Zeitlen 2008: 277). And this cautious tone is also present in reflections about the prospects 
for up-scaling experimentalism to the global level. 
9 
 
 
1.3 Towards a global democracy? 
Developing from these elements, experimentalists suggest that the deliberative mode of 
problem-solving is particularly suited to ‘diverse and volatile environments’, including 
transnational and global contexts. Indeed, the complex process of accountability, with its 
focus on multi-level networks, peer review, and democratic destabilizations, is offered to 
support the supposition that democratic deliberation should not be seen as bound to a 
particular place, nation or culture. Indeed, Sabel and Cohen (2005) have proposed the idea of 
applying experimentalist governance to the question of global democracy, through using it as 
a framework to reform what they see as an evolving ‘arena of global administration’. Their 
approach rests on two arguments: 
 
The first is that establishing new forms of accountability at the global level will—
because of the way that global administration connects with national rulemaking—
reshape national politics, perhaps helping to reinvigorate democracy there by opening 
areas of domestic rulemaking to a wider range of information, experience, and 
argument...The second is that those same accountability-enhancing measures have the 
potential to democratize emergent global administration itself, not by creating 
institutions of electoral accountability for a global government, but, in the first 
instance, by forming the people and public sphere that lie at the heart of democracy 
(Cohen and Sabel 2005: 766). 
 
Clearly, the first argument is an application of the democratic destabilization thesis to global 
administration. However, the second introduces the related idea that a democratizing outcome 
of experimentalist governance is its possible long-term contributions to the creation of a 
global democratic subject. In presenting this more ambitious thesis, Cohen and Sabel are 
careful to distance their proposals from utopian aspirations for a world state. Their alternative 
thought is that a progressive deepening of global administration across an expansive policy 
agenda—including trade, security, environment, health and education—could have surprising 
and profound consequences, at least if such administration follows a broadly experimental 
agenda. This would require, for instance, that ‘global rulemaking is increasingly accountable: 
preceded by hearings, shaped by participation of affected parties, subject to review, and 
defended by reference to what are commonly recognized as reasons in an emerging public 
reason of global political society’ (Cohen and Sabel 2006: 795). The growing public 
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awareness of—and, more ambitiously, participation in—this global administrative structure 
may, as a consequence, mean that ‘dispersed peoples might come to share a new identity as 
common members of an organized global populace’ (Cohen and Sabel 2006: 796). 
These reflections are described by Cohen and Sabel as somewhat ‘speculative’, but it 
is important to stress that their aspirations are often bolstered through hard-headed and 
empirically informed appraisals of ‘actually-existing’ global administration. In particular, 
they make a number of interesting points regarding the possibility of conceiving of structures 
of global trade in terms commensurate with their model of deliberative polyarchy. In 
particular, they note how ‘both the EU and the WTO anticipate that the freedom of (regional 
or international) trade they seek to foment will frequently conflict with, and need to be 
modified to accommodate, a wide range of normative concerns embodied in the domestic 
laws and regulations of member states trading in the relevant market’ (2006: 785-786). In 
addition, they note the way that both allow states to make their own domestic rules – that may 
inhibit trade – insofar as they reflect particular domestic standards. This is illustrated by the 
WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) — which applies to 
agricultural, health and safety regulation — and the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreement (Ibid. 786).  
Despite these similarities, Cohen and Sabel also explore significant differences 
between the EU and the WTO that have a bearing on the extent to which deliberative 
polyarchy can be achieved at the global level. The process of revising standards within the 
EU is highly elaborated and can rely on an established body of EU law and traditions of 
democratic, or quasi-democratic, policy-making. But the practices of international standard 
setting bodies are more complicated. Although in some cases – e.g. Codex Alimentarius and 
the European Food Safety Agency – standard setting bodies for global trade and the EU 
exhibit analogous features, they see more contrast, noting:  
 
Other domains lack fully authoritative, officially recognized, international standard-
setting bodies. In such areas, NGO and industry sponsored codes of good practice 
tend to compete with one other (as in forestry), or among themselves and with the 
officially recognized, but ineffective standard setter (as in labour matters). Some 
studies suggest that such competition encourages higher standards. But, nonetheless, a 
self-interested group could in theory establish a code of its own liking and offer it as a 
“basis” for domestic rulemaking to complicit governments. The magnitude of the 
democratizing destabilization effect depends on the balance between international 
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standard-setting bodies that are accountable or not to peer review, and the pressures to 
move towards or away from such accountability (Cohen and Sabel, 2006: 788). 
 
These differences, for us, suggest two possible lines of enquiry. Firstly, concerns are clearly 
raised about modes of standard setting and peer review which fall short of ‘fully 
authoritative’ international standard setting bodies. These types of arrangements do not 
appear to be prohibited by experimentalist governance, but Cohen and Sabel imply that they 
constitute something of a ‘hard case’ for their model of deliberative polyarchy. The problem 
is that such forums often generate a proliferation of standards and are particularly prone to 
manipulation by powerful stakeholders, which reduces their capacity to provide the kind of 
clear and robust processes of peer review necessary to guarantee effective accountability. 
Therefore we ask whether experimentalist governance should, in general, be wary of primary 
commodity Roundtables comprised of self-selected industry and NGO stakeholders?  
And secondly, it has been noted by some critics that, for all their virtues, advocates of 
experimentalist governance sometimes fail to provide a full account of the relevant 
constituency, or ‘public’, of deliberation above the level of the nation-state or the EU 
(Bohman 2007: 89). Cohen and Sabel therefore explore the potential for new forms of 
accountability to ‘create’ new democratic publics at the global level. The challenge of a 
policy area like global trade, though, is that ‘problem-solving’ is often seen through the lens 
of economic rationality, rather than the broader range of values and traditions associated with 
the pursuit of a ‘common’ or ‘collective’ good by a democratic polity. Therefore we ask 
whether the aspiration of producing a global democratic subject is unlikely, or perhaps even 
impossible, in global trade?  
Drawing these points together, in the next section we therefore explore primary 
commodities Roundtables as a ‘hard case’ for experimentalist governance, since the 
roundtables operate in an area of private standard setting that experimentalist governance 
might, to say the least, see as problematic.  
 
2. A case study of primary commodity roundtables 
In recent years a number of international standard-setting bodies, known variously as multi-
stakeholder initiatives or roundtables, have emerged to regulate primary commodity 
industries by devising a set of sustainability criteria which ensure workers, local communities 
and natural resources are better protected. This has taken place against the backdrop of 
increasing media exposure of the social exploitation and environmental degradation 
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associated with commodities like soy, sugarcane and palm oil (see BBC 2004; CNN 2009; 
The Economist 2010).  
The roundtables take their name from the fact that a variety of stakeholders comprise 
their membership, and, nominally at least, there is equal status between them in agenda-
setting and decision-making. Led by manufacturers/retailers and NGOs from the Global 
North, they also include farmers, fisheries and processors from the Global South, and in some 
cases banks, trade unions and academics as well. In this way they have differentiated 
themselves from other governance initiatives intended to promote ethically-acceptable 
production, such as corporate codes of conduct or ‘fair trade’ labelling initiatives, which rely 
on organisations from either the private sector or the third sector to compile the relevant 
regulations. The one stakeholder group explicitly excluded from roundtable membership have 
been governments (though many roundtables have received funding from state aid agencies).2 
By maintaining de jure autonomy from governments, the roundtables have been able to 
project themselves as commercially neutral and move further and faster in agreeing the 
standards against which producers will be certified. A notable exception here is the 
Roundtable for a Sustainable Cocoa Economy, which was born of the inter-governmental 
International Cocoa Organisation and has retained the influence of state bodies in its 
collective. It is notable, too, that this is the roundtable where least progress has been made 
toward codifying a sustainability standard. Both Côte d’Ivoire and Brazil have expressed the 
view that the RSCE should ‘avoid adopting a paternalistic approach in relation to the national 
sovereign policies of producing countries, through the imposition of certification’ (RSCE 
2009: 3).  
Having a membership that spans the international nodes of the supply chain, as well 
as the private and ‘not-for-profit’ sectors serves three important functions. First, it means that 
local knowledge can be shared about the challenges facing sustainable production in different 
parts of the world. This is crucial since the final standard has universal applicability – e.g. a 
soy producer in Brazil must meet the same criteria as one in India – and so it is necessary to 
have a set of requirements that are achievable in areas of different cultural, climatic, 
ecological and economic conditions.3 Second, bringing together an industry’s key companies 
                                                             
2 For example, the soy roundtable has received funding from the German state aid agency, and the cotton 
roundtable funding from the Swedish aid agency.  
3 The FSC is the notable exemption here. Its principles are universal but indicators and criteria regional. 
Furthermore, the operationalisation of these criteria, which are not specific enough for auditors to use, 
are developed by certifying bodies (see Gale and Haward 2004). 
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and NGOs simultaneously helps mitigate the issue of standard overlap.4 As Cohen and Sable 
identified, the forestry sector was afflicted with competing codes of good practice when the 
precursor to the current roundtable – the Forestry Stewardship Council – inspired major 
industry to provide their own watered-down imitations (Gale and Haward 2004). By getting 
powerful producers/retailers on board to begin with, the recent wave of roundtables has 
suppressed the emergence of alternative, potentially weaker standards. Third, while major 
industry representation offers greater coverage, NGO representation of course offers greater 
legitimacy. With an organisational mission to protect the environment and better society, 
NGOs are seen as vital bulwarks against the narrow commercial interests of corporations and 
are trusted with holding them to account through such institutions as roundtables. Table 1 
provides further details of the size and scope of the roundtables, and also highlights the role 
played by one NGO in particular, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), as a recurrent founder 
member. 
 
Table 1: Commodity roundtables as of August 2010 
Name Date established – 
current status 
Founder members Current membership  
Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) 
1993 – 125m 
hectares of forest 
certified with sales 
estimated at $20bn 
WWF, Rainforest 
Alliance, logging 
companies and 
forestry managers 
among others 
Over 500 members, 
represented in more 
than 50 countries 
Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC) 
1997 – 69 fisheries 
certified with 19 
undergoing 
assessment, covers 
7% of world catch 
WWF, Unilever 50 members 
Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil 
(RSPO) 
2003 – certified palm 
oil entered market 
2008 
Aarhus United UK 
Ltd, Golden Hope 
Plantations, 
Malaysian Palm Oil 
Association, Migros 
Genossenschafts 
Bund, Sainsbury’s, 
Unilever and WWF 
250 members, 
covering 40% global 
production mainly in 
Southeast Asia 
Better Cotton 
Initiative (BCI) 
2005 – market 
entrance expected by 
end 2010 
Adidas, Gap, H&M, 
ICCO, IFAP, 
International Finance 
Corporation, IKEA, 
30 members, 
production focus on 
Brazil, India, 
Pakistan and West 
                                                             
4 Complications arise with regards to biofuels, since RSB is a ‘meta-standard’ covering all biofuels, while 
BSI, RSPO and RTRS cover biofuels but only in their specific crop area, i.e. BSI covers ethanol biofuel 
made from sugarcane (see table 1 for acronyms). 
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Organic Exchange, 
Oxfam, PAN UK, 
and WWF 
Africa 
Roundtable on 
Responsible Soy 
Association (RTRS) 
2006 – field testing 
concluded; market 
entrance expected 
2011 
WWF, Unilever, 
Solidaridad, 
producers including 
Grupo Andre Maggi 
and ABIOVE, and 
Latin American 
NGOs  
130 members, 
production focus on 
Latin America and 
India 
Better Sugarcane 
Initiative (BSI) 
2006 – field testing 
of certification 
underway; market 
entrance expected 
end 2010  
WWF, Tate & Lyle, 
International Finance 
Corporation, 
independent farmers 
and social NGOs 
29 members, 
production focus on 
Brazil, Dominican 
Republic, India and 
Australia 
Roundtable on 
Sustainable Biofuel 
(RSB) 
2007 – field testing 
of certification 
completed; now 
revising certification 
standard  
WWF, National 
Wildlife Federation, 
Shell, BP, Bunge, 
Toyota, producers 
including UNICA, 
academics 
 
100 members 
Roundtable for a 
Sustainable Cocoa 
Economy (RSCE) 
2007 – developing 
guidelines on best 
practice and 
exploring challenges 
of certification 
No official 
membership as yet – 
over  200 
organisations attend 
first meeting  
300 public, private 
and third sector 
organisations attend 
last international 
meeting 
Aquaculture 
Stewardship Council 
(ASC) 
2009 – business 
development phase; 
market entrance 
expected 2011 
WWF and IDH 
(Dutch Sustainable 
Trade Initiative) 
13 ‘supporters’ and 
hundreds of 
organisations 
participating in the 
standard ‘dialogues’  
Sustainable Beef 
Roundtable 
Planned 2011 – 
stakeholders to be 
brought together end 
of 2010   
Cargill, 
Intervet/Schering-
Plough Animal 
Health, JBS, 
McDonald’s and 
WWF 
N/A 
 
2.1 Deliberation within: the development of the roundtable sustainability standard 
The reason for flagging up the role of the WWF, and for ordering the entries in Table 1 on a 
chronological basis, is to suggest how the mode and outcomes of deliberation within the 
roundtables have come to share important features. Gibbon and Lazaro have noted how 
multi-stakeholder standards have reflected a set of common norms inherited from the initial 
FSC model and subsequently codified by the International Social and Environmental 
Accreditation and Labelling Alliance (ISEAL). With respect to governance, these include 
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providing equal voting rights in a common governing body and organising different 
interested parties in separate chambers. With respect to the sustainability standard, norms 
include making the standard available in the public domain, conducting periodic reviews, 
using public consultation and feedback when revisions are proposed, and providing 
meaningful opportunities to participate by those affected by the standard’s implementation 
(Gibbon and Lazaro 2010: 8).  
In practice, then, although each roundtable has its own specific organisational 
structure and set of processes, since most are members of ISEAL and all founded on the 
initiative of the WWF, some broad-brush similarities can be identified. For one, the executive 
bodies have been constitutionally-bound to represent the three main stakeholder groups of 
buyers, producers and civil society, and by extension both developed and developing 
countries. In addition, many roundtables have issue-specific chambers or a cross-issue 
Stakeholder Council, in which a wider section of the membership can debate and pass 
recommendations to the executive body. Access to this institution can be considered fairly 
open by the standards of most global governance bodies. Membership is open to all 
stakeholders subject to approval by existing members and payment of a fee. Moreover, in the 
post-2000 roundtables at least, significant effort has been made to engage different 
stakeholders through outreach meetings, with founder members travelling to a country likely 
to undertake certification and holding public meetings on the process and/or conducting field 
tests. Finally, in relation to standard deliberation, members of the public have been able to 
comment directly on its suitability without having to become a member of the roundtable 
itself.  
It is these institutional features that help distinguish the roundtables from other 
regulatory bodies in international trade such as the WTO. In contrast to the WTO, which is 
frequently marked by negotiations based on open horse-trading and brinkmanship, the 
roundtables attempt to cultivate a more consensus-based process. Thus, alongside the spirit of 
inclusivity and reason-giving embodied within the roundtables’ architecture, there is also an 
engrained culture of devolving information-gathering and legislative activities to independent 
experts (Gibbon and Lazaro 2010: 8). So, for instance, the roundtables covering biofuel 
feedstock (BSI, RSB, RSPO and RTRS) have had to make sure that their commodities are 
produced in such a way as to maximise carbon savings; an assurance which requires scientific 
knowledge of fuel emissions, soil management, plant biology, etc. In the case of the 
sugarcane roundtable, an ‘Environment Working Group’ was created with industry experts 
hired to synthesize the various (valid) suggestions on measuring greenhouse gas emissions 
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and ensure that its reporting mechanisms would be recognised as scientifically legitimate by 
observers. The use of ‘politically neutral’ consultants to lead technical working groups or 
provide reports for individual roundtable members, then, both  prevents standard-setting from 
becoming overtly politically and also serves to ‘operationalise’ sustainability by codifying it 
and making it quantifiable.   
  Deliberation within the roundtables thus takes place, first, through the public 
reasoning which members must initiate when discussing the efficacy and veracity of the 
standard, and second, through the peer review element prompted by the shared experience of 
members across multiple roundtables. Evidence of this deliberation can be seen in the 
‘tailoring’ of governance arrangements across issue areas. For instance, although the 
constitutional form of the roundtables can be traced back to the FSC, Gale and Haward note 
an important distinction to have emerged in the course of their proliferation. They contrast 
the FSC’s member-driven governance with the more managerial governance and streamlined 
standard of the MSC, tentatively suggesting that this was a result of the WWF’s perceived 
failure of the FSC and reluctance to establish another decentralised organisation to regulate 
fishing (Gale and Haward 2004). An example of the experimentation produced in ‘law’ can 
be seen in the emphasis laid on differing elements of sustainability. While the RSPO and 
RTRS have multiple criterion linked to the impact that their commodities have on local 
communities – covering issues such as compulsory community rights assessments, 
compensation for loss of land, and opportunities for local employment – perhaps since it has 
been less affected by the particular charges of ‘land grabbing’, the BSI standard has only one 
such criteria (BSI 2010; RSPO 2007; RTRS 2010).  
 
2.2 Deliberative reflection: the response of civil society to roundtable standards  
Despite bringing NGOs firmly within the formal decision-making apparatus of trade 
governance, wider support for the roundtables within global civil society has been far from 
evident. As we show below, the roundtables have prompted a wide range of communicative 
action critical of their project, with many civil society actors denouncing the roundtables and 
their attendant standards. Such responses might be taken to suggest that the problem is simply 
one of ratcheting up the regulation in response to fresh evidence. Yet such a reading would 
overlook the reasons why civil society actors see roundtables as failing to deliver greater 
sustainability, and, in doing so belie their fundamental misgivings about this form of trade 
governance. Three critiques related to the practice, purpose and unequal power relations of 
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roundtables help to explain the complex forms of deliberation that have emerged not just 
within the roundtables, but also against them.   
The critique of practice refers to the limits of certification for promoting 
sustainability. Focusing on the Marine Stewardship Council, one aspect of this refers to the 
difficulties for smaller producers to become standard compliant. Ponte has written how the 
MSC has already had to reform its arrangements to make concessions for the small-scale and 
developing country fisheries that were marginalised from its system. This involved improving 
the awareness of its standard in developing countries, introducing special flexibilities within 
its procedural framework, and developing guidance on the use of ‘unorthodox’ information 
such as traditional ecological knowledge. However, Ponte then goes on to question whether 
greater technical assistance and capacity building alone are sufficient to encourage adoption 
of the standard, given that the more significant entry barrier related to ‘delivering 
sustainability at no additional cost and in large volumes’. Rooted in a lack of managerial 
resources, access to networks, and economies of scale, he concludes that this material 
inequality has proven a lot harder to manage away (Ponte 2008: 171). This is not just an issue 
of exclusivity. A number of academics have publicly criticised the MSC for pursuing greater 
volumes of certified fish rather than focusing on improvements in sustainability per se. This 
increases the pressure to certify ever-larger and more industrial fisheries, and with it, 
increasingly questionable certification decisions. Consequently, the MSC was advised to 
create protected marine areas and focus certification on smaller fisheries precisely because 
these were inherently more sustainable (Jacquet et al. 2010). 
The critique of purpose pertains to the representativeness of roundtables. The 
Corporate Europe Observatory, a campaign group which challenges the privileged access of 
corporations in EU policy-making, has argued that roundtables lack full involvement of small 
farmers, landless peoples’ organisations and trade unions (CEO, TNI and GRR 2007). In a 
subsequent report on the sugar roundtable, they noted how membership of the BSI is 
comprised mainly of large multinational companies and Northern NGOs, with poorer 
stakeholders from the Global South excluded by the high membership fees.5 While this might 
seem a complaint that could be resolved through reform to membership requirements or a 
concerted recruitment campaign, the NGO cast doubt on this possibility. They suggest instead 
                                                             
5 It is worth bearing in mind that roundtables do display some sensitivity to differences in financial 
resources. Fees differ according to both organisational type (e.g. civil society organisations pay less than 
corporations) and location (e.g. a lower fee is paid by NGOs from the Global South than the Global 
North). However, other resource constraints, such as language barriers and manpower, are not so easily 
accounted for. 
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that the absence of affected communities is symptomatic of a body created precisely to 
provide a veneer of credibility to sugarcane bio-fuels and gain public support for the industry. 
As such, CEO chose to dismiss deliberation with the roundtable and focus instead on 
lobbying policy-makers setting the target for mandatory biofuel consumption in the EU (CEO 
2009). 
Finally, the critique of power relations concerns the weak sanctioning mechanisms of 
roundtables. The trade union the International Union of Food workers (IUF), for instance, has 
claimed that Musim Mas, a member of RSPO which formerly served on its board, has been 
guilty of flagrant violations of labour rights. It condemned the RSPO for failing to recognise 
these breaches of the standard and eject Musim Mas as a member on the spot, regardless of 
whether it might subsequently pass the certification audit, which, in the event, it did (IUF 
2006). In another case involving the RSPO, Greenpeace alleged that its standard has not been 
fully implemented across the membership, as either subsidiaries or different national 
branches of members have engaged in illegal land acquisition and deforestation practices 
whilst the parent company continued to sell palm oil under the RSPO-certified label 
(Greenpeace 2008; 2009b). Again, this raises difficult questions for critical civil society 
actors, as if the resolve to discipline key stakeholders is lacking, then what good does it do 
submitting evidence to the roundtable? For its part, Greenpeace has adopted a multi-faceted 
strategy, suggesting that the ‘RSPO must implement and toughen up its existing criteria’ 
whilst also arguing that ‘voluntary certification alone cannot be sufficient to protect the last 
forests of South-East Asia’ (Greenpeace 2008: 3). To provide such outside impetus, the 
organisation has lobbied the brand-name manufactures in the RSPO to abandon contentious 
suppliers outright – through such means as storming Unilever’s headquarters dressed as 
orang-utans, an animal directly threatened by the loss of its habitat to oil palm – and has also 
called upon states in the region to implement a moratorium on further land clearance 
(Hickman 2010).  
In each of these cases, civil society actors have directly engaged with the constitution 
and content of the commodity roundtables, even if they have subsequently denounced the 
arrangement as inadequate. An alternative, more radical critique has been to point out the 
inability of the roundtables to address the macro-effects of expanding commodity production. 
Taking aim at the soy industry both Friends of the Earth and ad hoc associations of NGOs 
have claimed that the expansion of soy monoculture is inextricably linked to the expulsion of 
rural communities, reduced access to land for traditional food production, and the loss of 
native habitats. Moreover, they argue that certification actually legitimises the promotion of 
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soy monoculture to meet the demand for ever more animal feed and bio-fuel (Friends of the 
Earth 2008a; ASEED Europe et al. 2008). In other words, in taking the supply-chain as the 
organising principle for sustainability, the roundtables are alleged to overlook the cumulative 
dangers that accrue when a particular production model is replicated to an ever-greater extent. 
Consequently, rather than lobbying for standards to be strengthened or companies to be 
brought to heel, these two organisations – along with 228 other civil society groups – in fact 
called for the RTRS to be abandoned. In its stead, they called for a reduction in meat 
consumption and carbon-intensive travel in Northern states, and the promotion of land reform 
and peasant-based ‘food sovereignty’ models in the South (Friends of the Earth et al. 2010).  
 
3. Conceptualising roundtables as experimentalist governance 
The preceding analysis offers resources for thinking about the prospects for exporting the 
idea of experimentalist governance into global regulation of trade. In particular, it enables us 
to formulate empirically-informed, albeit tentative, answers to the two questions posed 
towards the end of our discussion of experimentalist governance, that relate to the content 
and cultural background of roundtables. In order to reach that point, though, it is first 
necessary to interpret the successes and failures of the roundtables through reference to the 
broader normative aims of experimentalist governance. The point of such an analysis is to 
ascertain whether and to what extent it is plausible to interpret roundtables as a manifestation 
of experimentalist governance. This task is pursued through examining the roundtables in 
relation to three distinct dimensions of experimentalist governance: first, their departure from 
a principal-agent model of accountability; second, their capacity to generate democratic 
destabilization effects in national and transnational contexts; and, third, their contribution to 
the task of democratizing the regulation of global trade. 
 
3.1 Roundtables, principal-agent relations and deliberative polyarchy 
A key feature of experimentalist governance, as discussed in the first section, is that it departs 
from what Cohen and Sabel describe as the ‘principal-agent’ model of accountability. In their 
account of deliberative polyarchy, an alternative model is advanced that allows policy goals 
to be set through collaborative processes of reason-giving between a range of actors involved 
in making and appraising policy (Cohen and Sabel 2006: 779-84). Although roundtables are 
not, strictly speaking, policy-making bodies, their methods of selecting and policing industry-
wide standards for global commodity production bears a striking resemblance to the 
deliberative mechanisms favoured by proponents of experimentalist governance. 
20 
 
 The first aspect to note is that roundtables, or their founding members, do not operate 
at all like the ‘principals’ or ‘agents’ critiqued by Cohen and Sabel. The roundtables do not 
propose or have access to ex ante standards for sustainable community production but are 
established, in part, to formulate and refine such standards. This is illustrated by the process 
through which general principles are translated into detailed and quantifiable criteria that can 
be applied to the assessment of distinct areas of commodity production. A feature of this 
process, as we have seen, is that standards tend to ‘evolve’ throughout the lifespan of 
different roundtables. The standards are subject to periodic revision thanks to the shifting 
nature of the membership of roundtables, with new members introducing different 
perspectives to internal deliberations and building upon a growing pool of experience and 
knowledge about the adequacy and effectiveness of existing standards. This is an important 
consideration in assessing the experimentalist credentials of roundtables, as a feature of 
deliberative polyarchy is that goals or standards should be subject to periodic revision in the 
light of social learning about their application. The idea is that deliberative polyarchy 
‘improves implementation’ of norms or standards, while also generating ‘improved 
understandings of goals and shifts in the content of norms’ (Cohen and Sabel 2006: 790). The 
process through which roundtables construct and revise industry-standards through an 
inclusive and transparent process of deliberation chimes with the aspirations of 
experimentalist governance. 
The second feature of roundtables relevant in this context is their apparent 
incorporation of institutional dynamics that bear some resemblance to the processes of ‘peer 
review’ defended by experimentalist governance. The importance of this process, to recall, is 
that the bodies responsible for constructing, interpreting, and revising goals must be 
compelled to defend their actions to analogous authorities—or ‘peers’—who are in a position 
to evaluate and assess the performance of those bodies. This process also facilitates a 
collaborative pooling of knowledge and information, which allows an area of regulation to 
receive solutions appropriate to its particular settings while also allowing for deliberative 
comparison with solutions adopted in analogous areas (Cohen and Sabel 2006: 781). In 
relation to roundtables, collaborative learning is facilitated by the fact that particular 
organizations, such as Unilever and WWF, are members of a range of commodity 
roundtables, which places them in an efficacious position to learn from their experiences of 
roundtables in different areas of commodity production. The role of the ISEAL Alliance in 
providing a set of common standards—and a pool of collective knowledge—for roundtables 
is particularly important here. And, the degree of scrutiny that roundtables receive from 
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NGOs ensures that members must both defend the relevant standard and ensure that their 
conduct coheres with it. These features of the roundtable ‘system’ resemble the kind of 
collaborative processes and accountability central to deliberative polyarchy. 
At the same time, it is important to stress that the ‘fit’ between roundtables and 
deliberative polyarchy is far from perfect. In particular, although the roundtables incorporate 
peer review to some degree, it is not evident that the peer review element satisfies the 
demanding normative requirements imposed by some advocates of experimentalist 
governance. Consider, for example, Sabel and Zeitlin’s description of peer review in the EU, 
which is based on complex institutional networks where various rule-making and rule-
implementing bodies are formally obliged to justify their decisions to each other and may, in 
some cases, be subject to ‘penalty defaults’ imposed in the event of perceived failures (2009: 
305-12). This process is explicitly contrasted with forms of monitoring and accountability 
that rest on irregular processes of information sharing and the weak force that ‘moral suasion’ 
and ‘fear of public embarrassment’ might bring to bear on intransigent institutional actors. 
This type of peer review, complain Sabel and Zeitlin, is ‘unworkable because in the absence 
of any sanction or discipline the actors could well choose to limit themselves to pro forma 
participation or worse yet manipulate the information they provide so as to show themselves, 
deceptively, to best advantage’ (2009: 305).  
On the one hand, the experience of roundtables provides evidence to temper this 
scepticism. The account of the ‘external’ deliberations between roundtables and NGOs, for 
example, demonstrates the scope for smart, media-savvy, activists to compel a change of 
behaviour on the part of industry stakeholders through publicity-generating campaigns. On 
the other hand, the roundtable system of regulation does appear to bear out some of the fears 
of Sabel and Zeitlin. The unsystematic nature of the feedback mechanisms between 
roundtables and external critics, and between the roundtables themselves, arguably hinders 
the capacity of roundtables to instigate and benefit from social learning. In addition, the risk 
of alienating key stakeholders, whose participation is essential to the workability of 
roundtables, acts as a constraint on censuring or penalizing powerful actors. As Grant 
Rosaman, Forests Campaigner for Greenpeace, has put it: ‘When WWF becomes an external 
assessment body for the companies, the companies become their clients and it gets very 
difficult for them [the WWF] to stay loyal to their agenda’ (Rosaman cited in Zhou 2010). 
The roundtables, then, can at best be described as partial realizations of deliberative 
polyarchy. 
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3.2 Roundtables, civil society and democratic destabilization 
Let us turn now to the relationship between roundtables and democratic destabilization. The 
latter idea, as discussed above, is an important element of the case in favour of 
experimentalist governance. It describes a situation where the creation of new forms of 
accountability at the global or transnational level will reinvigorate democracy in domestic 
contexts, by creating new sources of information, experience, and argument that can be 
mobilized by governments and social critics. This effect can be discerned in the EU, 
according to Sabel and Zeitlin, as increased transparency and participation in its regulation 
stimulates deliberation within and across member states (2008: 312-23). Although the 
dynamics at work in roundtables are quite different, not least because of the relatively minor 
role played by states or governments, the internal and external deliberations of roundtables 
appear to trigger similar destabilization effects in relation to regulation of trade. These arise, 
we suggest, as beneficial side-effects of the ambivalent attitude of civil society actors towards 
the roundtables. 
 The literature on deliberative democracy often ascribes to civil society a ‘unitary’ role 
as a social critic or advocate. Higgott and Erman’s work on the WTO is instructive here, in 
their endorsement of a ‘normative division of labour’ with states enforcing decisions and 
global civil society actors instigating processes of opinion- and will-formation (Higgott and 
Erman 2010). Our research on roundtables, however, suggests that such a narrow focus on 
global civil society ignores the democratic stakes of the genuine fissures between and within 
NGOs during such processes. ‘Global civil society’ is by no means a unitary actor in the 
internal and external deliberations of roundtables. Instead, civil society is constituted by the 
division, noted above, between reformist and radical strategies towards roundtables. This 
spectrum points to the fissure that exists between groups who are willing and able to 
participate in, and comprehend the intricacies of, roundtables, and those who are not. For the 
former, reformist arguments – in particular the critiques of regulation on its own terms – 
require civil society actors to function in more of an ‘expert’ than ‘activist’ manner, at least in 
the initial unfolding of the critique. It is notable that prominent ‘direct action’ groups like 
Greenpeace – an organisation with previous experience in certification via its membership of 
FSC – have engaged in such detailed readings of roundtable regulation. For the latter, 
roundtables are discredited for the purpose of communicating to publics, states and 
international organizations, such as the EU, the opposition of social movements to the very 
idea of industry-led attempts at ‘sustainable’ trade in certain commodities. 
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These different orientations do not merely reflect substantive disagreements about the 
merits of roundtables, but also reflect different strategies for dealing with the more general 
phenomenon of the ‘institutionalization’ of social movements. This is described by David 
Meyer and Sidney Tarrow as a process through which civil society organizations modify their 
challenges to various sites of authority in return for opportunities to influence their actions 
(1998: 21). The NGOs that participate in or recognize roundtables do so, in part, because they 
believe that inclusion in their internal deliberations will allow them to shape their agenda and 
design. The prize on offer is the creation and enforcement of standards that will exercise 
genuine control over powerful industry actors. In fact, reformist groups often combine tactics 
of (internal) expert participation and (external) activist criticism. This is illustrated by the 
willingness of Greenpeace to combine participation in some roundtables (FSC) with public 
criticism of others (RSPO), or to combine the strategies of invoking roundtable standards as 
salient, albeit inadequate, targets for sustainable production and engaging in direct action 
campaigns against intransigent industry roundtable members. This reflects the increasing 
capacity of civil society actors to ‘move between conventional and unconventional collective 
actions, and even to employ both sorts of strategies in combination’ (Meyer and Tarrow 
1998: 23). The NGOs and other actors that refuse participation or recognition are, despite 
appearances to the contrary, no less ‘institutionalized’ than their reformist cousins, but merely 
adopt a contrasting strategy for generating public influence.  
So, although civil society is often seen to operate in a straightforward ‘oppositional’ 
manner with regards to institutions and private organisations, we can, in fact, identify an 
informal spectrum between supportive and critical activities (Brassett and Smith 2010). The 
literature on global deliberation often attempts to ‘adjudicate’ between reformist and radical 
civil society strategies, with different theorists preferring different strategies depending on 
their normative orientations (Dryzek 2006). However, the framework of experimentalist 
governance, particularly its concept of democratic destabilization, suggests that greater 
benefits for deliberation may emerge in contexts where both reformist and radical civil 
society groups engage in a process of ‘competition’ for public opinion and influence. The 
positive by-product of this competition is a progressive expansion of the social argumentative 
pool, as competing perspectives on new sites of global accountability are introduced into 
national or transnational public spheres. Global regulatory bodies, such as roundtables, 
become focal points for a process of public contestation, as social critics draw on their 
knowledge and experience to formulate contrasting appraisals of their worth. The public 
expression of competing insider and outsider perspectives from well-respected NGOs 
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reenergises democracy by disturbing ‘deliberative inertia’, which is characteristic of 
circumstances where processes of public deliberation take place against a backdrop of tacit 
assumptions that marginalize alternative perspectives (Smith 2010). The depiction of 
roundtables as ‘smokescreens’ for sustainability, diverting attention from the wider ‘off-farm’ 
problems linked to the expansion of capital-intensive agriculture, is a good example of how 
such inertial dynamics can be challenged (Friends of the Earth 2008b). In this reading, then, 
the internal and external deliberations of roundtables do appear to generate the kind of 
democratic destabilizations favoured by experimentalist governance.  
 
3.3 Roundtables and the democratization of global trade 
The final stage of this comparison is to consider the extent to which the roundtables 
contribute at all to the grander project of experimentalist government: the long-term creation 
of a global democracy. The idea, to recall, is that deepening networks of global 
administration, shot through with peer review and democratic destabilizations, can contribute 
to the formation of a global democratic subject, whose members identify with each other and 
recognize certain interests in common (Cohen and Sabel 2006: 794-7). These effects, as 
advocates of experimentalist governance admit, are speculative and difficult to discern. It is, 
therefore, difficult to apply this idea to the evaluation of the roundtable system. It would 
seem, however, that unlike the previous two comparisons, which gave reasons to treat 
roundtables as at least partial instances of experimentalist governance, the analysis here is 
more circumspect.  
 The democratic credentials of roundtables are questionable on a number of fronts. 
First, although some roundtables succeed in providing a degree of representation for a wide 
range of stakeholders, the relations between participants departs to a considerable degree 
from plausible democratic expectations about equal status or fair opportunities to influence 
debate and decisions. This replicates a well-documented and widespread pattern of inequality 
between North and South in various sites of global governance (Glenn 2008). What is 
interesting in this case, though, is that it is not just powerful corporations that enjoy increased 
opportunities for influencing agendas but certain civil society actors too, namely Northern 
NGOs. Jason Clay, Senior Vice President for Market Transformation at WWF and a key 
figure in the development of the roundtables has articulated this (non-state) ‘club’ mentality 
well:  
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We are reaching the limits of natural resources on the planet. Any thinking 
environmentalist would want to see more intensification of agriculture... Do we want 
to work with 6 billion consumers? Do we want to work with 1 billion producers? Or 
do we want to work with 300 to 500 buyers of any given commodity?’ (Clay cited in 
Gunther 2008).  
 
Second, notwithstanding experimentalist optimism about counter-balancing the 
threats of technocratic management, there are genuine democratic concerns about the mode 
of regulation employed by roundtables. As Ponte argues, within international multi-
stakeholder initiatives ‘sustainability becomes auditable, systemic and managerial’ (Ponte 
2008: 171). The danger here is that a profoundly political issue becomes accessible only to 
those with the resources and inclination to interpret it through ‘expert eyes’. By its own 
admission, WWF recognises that the resource-intensive nature of participation in the 
roundtables suggests that they might simply become a ‘coalition of the active’ (WWF 2010: 
13). A risk they attach to this is a lack of representation preventing adequate expertise from 
emerging, particularly from social groups representing small producers and local 
communities since these are often unorganised (WWF 2010: 18). We would go further, 
however, to stress the performative barriers erected by the generalisation of quantitative 
method and abstracted rationality. This can have the counter-productive effect of 
marginalising or delegitimizing local, socially embedded conceptions of primary commodity 
production, in which case it is arguable that the best placed candidates to speak for under-
represented groups would be excluded from the off.  
And thirdly, drawing these points together, there is an apparent absence of what we 
might describe as a democratic ethos on the part of participants to roundtables at litmus test 
moments. A familiar thought in normative reflections on democratic citizenship is that 
members of a democratic community should recognize duties to promote the common good 
and abide by the outcomes of decision-making procedures (Miller 2000). The orientation of 
many participants in roundtables—particularly powerful industry actors—appears to fall far 
short of this ideal, as witnessed by NGO documentation of pervasive attempts to water down 
standards or exploit opportunities to avoid compliance with them. These instances of duty-
avoidance are particularly damaging to the roundtable system, given the previously 
documented difficulty of imposing sanctions on non-cooperative parties. 
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4. Conclusion: Deliberation without democracy?  
This paper has surveyed the emerging idea of experimentalist governance and applied it as a 
framework for understanding and evaluating commodity roundtables as an innovative method 
of regulating an aspect of global trade. The preceding discussion suggests that commodity 
roundtables can, with some justification, be interpreted as an imperfect manifestation of 
experimentalist governance. At the same time, the pervasive failings of these institutions 
reveal—at least in relation to this method of regulating global trade—the distance between 
the ideal and the reality of experimentalist global governance. At the beginning of this 
investigation, we made clear our intent not merely to operationalise experimentalist 
governance as a theoretical framework for understanding and appraising extant governance 
structures but also to use our case study as a means of reflecting back on the framework itself. 
In this concluding section we make good this claim by briefly returning to the questions 
raised about the framework at the end of the first section. 
The first question, to recall, asked about the potential of non-conventional regulatory 
bodies, comprised of self-selected civil society and industry actors, to embody the virtues of 
peer review and accountability prized by advocates of experimentalist governance. Some 
advocates of experimentalist governance, as we have seen, express reservations about 
regulatory structures that enable stakeholders to set and police ‘their own’ standards (Cohen 
and Sabel, 2006: 788). The concern is that industry and NGO-led initiatives are prone to 
generate a proliferation of competing standards, as well as suffering from lax enforcement 
mechanisms and manipulation by powerful groups. Our analysis of roundtables certainly 
offers some basis for scepticism in relation to the latter point, but also suggested that other 
reasons why such bodies should be taken seriously by advocates of experimentalist 
governance. Compared to ‘traditional’ global governance arrangements in trade such as the 
WTO, the roundtables have certainly produced more ambitious socio-ecological regulation, 
and many large-scale members have made progress towards these ends. Furthermore, the 
deliberative benefits of roundtables, generated in particular by the destabilizing effects of 
collaborative and competitive relations between (and within) industry and civil society, 
suggest that experimentalists should not neglect these arenas in favour of those, like the EU 
or WTO, that are ‘graced’ by greater state involvement.  
The second question addressed the challenge of democratizing deliberation in the 
absence of the supportive social background. An attractive feature of experimentalist 
governance is the willingness of its advocates to speculate about the potential democratizing 
effects of introducing—or, perhaps better, reforming—complex administrative structures in 
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the global realm. Our findings suggest that a degree of caution be injected to expectations for 
accelerating global democratization through innovative reforms in the trade arena. As we 
discussed toward the end of the third section, experimentalist governance structures that are 
imposed onto a global order skewed in favour of powerful corporate and privileged NGO 
actors are likely to replicate the deficiencies of that broader context. This means that it will 
prove difficult, to say the least, to defend the democratic credentials of such structures. 
However, the democratic failings of roundtables by no means obviate their virtues as 
deliberative bodies. This suggests that, although roundtables may not be sufficiently 
democratic in their composition and operation, through their capacity to trigger democratic 
destabilization they may indirectly facilitate values associated with democracy. This idea is 
expressed by Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane, in their claim that innovative global 
institutions may promote democratic values—like transparency, accountability, and reason-
giving—without structuring the global order along recognizably democratic lines (Buchanan 
and Keohane 2006: 433-4). The virtue of this perspective is that it enables us to distinguish 
between democracy and deliberation, recognizing that the latter may be present—and may 
even flourish—in contexts where the former is not realized to a satisfactory degree (Smith 
and Brassett 2008).  
In conclusion, our aim is to encourage the further development of experimentalist 
governance as an important framework for addressing deliberative global governance. In that 
spirit we put forward two propositions, one more pragmatic, one more critical/political, both, 
we think geared towards the development of the democratic. A pragmatic response to the 
problems identified is to focus on the prospects for improving the deliberative credentials of 
existing arrangements. Our reforms should look, in the first instance, towards enhancing the 
reason-responsiveness of global institutional arrangements, in the hope that they can advance 
certain democratic values even in the absence of global democracy. This may seem an un-
ambitious stance, which certainly calls for further support and explanation than can be 
provided here. It is, though, important to note that it is quite compatible with continued 
reflection on the theory and (potential) practice of global democracy. In fact, we might 
contend that it is the failure to fully acknowledge the difficulties and challenges of 
democratizing the global order that is, ultimately, more dangerous to the project of global 
democracy. The inevitable disappointments of ‘real world’ experiments in global governance 
may, in the absence of a certain kind of empirically-informed realism, cultivate a fatalism that 
would be corrosive to the unfinished project of democracy. 
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One proposal we make, therefore, is that the common suggestion that civil society 
activists should tailor their arguments to fit within the professional policy discourses of 
global governance might be reversed? What if, for instance, such global governance bodies 
were encouraged to conduct formal surveys of civil society positions on their regulatory 
practices? At the very least, building such a mechanism into the day to day operations of 
Roundtables would further allow for the communication of a broad range of reasons around 
the subject of sustainability. Such a reform might work to institutionalise – in a small way - a 
critical public sphere that could allow for more radical reasons to enter the Roundtables. 
Thus, secondly, accepting the pragmatic turn to enhance deliberative processes, in political 
terms we might seek to think through and perhaps encourage processes of ‘deliberation 
against’ in order to mobilise broader public opinions. Recognising the importance of 
‘deliberation against’ might afford one route, albeit piecemeal and long-term, to the 
politicisation of ‘off farm issues’ and difficulties of reconciling a global scale with diversity 
and local practices. In this sense, while dressing up as orang-utans might not strike many 
deliberative theorists as particularly ‘reasonable’ or ‘profound’ gesture, such performative 
practices highlight the ethical implications of the decisions made in deliberative forums like 
Roundtables and therefore suggest one way in which the genuine democratic stakes of 
sustainability can be publicised.  
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